Chile turns mirror blocking into a standing pipeline: 42 gambling domains ordered blocked in 48 hours

On 1 September 2026, Chile’s telecoms regulator Subtel ordered the country’s six main ISPs — Entel, Movistar, Claro, GTD, WOM and VTR — to block 42 gambling URLs by DNS within 48 hours of notification. The list was validated by the Superintendency of Casino Gaming (SCJ) and enforces a Supreme Court ruling obtained by Lotería de Concepción against the telcos, with the DNS method ratified by the Santiago Court of Appeals.

The order itself is not the story. The procedure is.

A pipeline, not a one-off

Subtel’s notice spells out a standing four-step mechanism: the claimant (Lotería de Concepción or another party) compiles domains, subdomains and derived or mirror sites; the SCJ certifies which ones operate without authorisation; Subtel notifies the ISPs with the annex attached; the ISPs execute the DNS block within 48 hours and prove compliance directly to the Court of Appeals. Crucially, the notice states the procedure “will be applied successively” to new domains, subdomains and mirror sites as they appear — with a built-in correction path for wrongly identified addresses.

That design comes straight out of Subtel’s June technical report to the court, which weighed deep packet inspection, SNI filtering and DNS blocking, and recommended DNS as the only proportionate option — while admitting, in writing, that “no mechanism is 100% effective at permanently blocking mirror sites”.

We read the list

The 42 entries are not 42 operators. Five brands appear twice — a main domain plus a variant (rojabet.cl and rojabet.com, betsala.com and betsala11.com, micasino.com and micasinoenvivo.com, estelarbet.cl and estelarbet.vip, coolbet.com and coolbetchile.com). Several more entries are numbered mutations of brands already on the list or of well-known operators: betsson1001.com next to betsson.com/cl, rab0na-2417.com next to rabona.com, z2.bet365.com, nayafacil-903.com. Flagship domains of international operators — stake.com, 1xbet.com, bc.game, melbet.com, lat.betano.com, tonybet.com — sit on the same annex as the mirror spam.

This is the same picture we documented in Romania a month ago, where ONJN blacklisted 808 domains in a single session and 99% of them were numbered rotation ranges off nine brand strings. Two regulators on two continents, weeks apart, have stopped treating domains as the unit of enforcement and started treating the platform root and its mirror farm as one target.

What this means for you

If you are a licensed operator, the mirror farms that clone your brand now have a second enemy: regulators are building rolling pipelines that accept updated mirror lists on a standing basis, not through fresh litigation each time. Feeding those pipelines accurate, verified clone inventories is becoming a real enforcement channel — in Chile, the procedure explicitly accepts submissions of “derived or mirror sites” from interested parties.

The flip side: DNS blocking lists sweep broadly, and official domains of operators licensed elsewhere land on the same annexes as the clones imitating them. Knowing what is on these lists — and getting wrongly listed addresses corrected through the error-correction paths both Chile and Romania now provide — is part of brand hygiene in any market where you hold or plan a licence.

Counsel’s note. Most brands treat mirror farms as the regulator’s problem and wait for the next blocking wave to catch some of the clones. That fails on both ends: state DNS blocking works per market and lags the farm by design — Subtel put in writing that no mechanism stops mirrors permanently. The working method is to attack the farm at its infrastructure: map the rotation pattern, hit the registrar and host where the domains actually live, and use the regulatory pipelines as one distribution channel for an inventory you maintain yourself. We broke the method down in our guide to taking down casino clone websites.